Aktor Group CEO Alexander Exarch, at the Delphi Economic Forum highlighted the crucial role of the Vertical Energy Corridor from Alexandroupoli to Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine. Germany reacts strongly as it loses its position as Europe's main energy hub. Berlin, which since the 1970s depended on Russian gas, has invested billions in LNG terminals. The new runway makes Greece an entry portal for an American LNG to Central Europe, reducing its German influence and revenues from transit fees.
Analyticalally:
The intervention of the CEO of Aktor Group and CEO of Atlantic SEE LNG Trade, Alexander Exarch, within the framework of the Delphi Economic Forum, on the safe energy future of Europe and the key role of the Vertical Axis starting from Alexandroupolis and currently covering Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, shed light on a – currently – invisible rift, which may jeopardise Europe's own energy security.
We have held three plus one points from his intervention.
The first is that Europe's main problem is no longer so much the price of energy as its availability. Since Europe has relied too much on cheap Russian gas and is now exposed.
The second is that Europe's energy security goes through long-term LNG supply agreements, mainly from the US. A field in which significant reactions appear, particularly from countries in Northern Europe and in particular Germany.
The third is the need to create a second FSRU unit and possibly a third over time in Greece in order to ensure full vertical runway.
And the «plus one» the point - which is most important - is that the Vertical Corridor or «Vertical Corridor» is not another energy project of many. But a crucial strategic alternative route to transport an American LNG, which strengthens the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Greece, making our country a protagonist of Europe's energy security.
The reactions
The Vertical Corridor offers solutions to the European energy puzzle, so it is logical to create strong reactions from all who were and remain satisfied with the current situation.
Moscow
First and best Moscow reacts. Since its influence in Ukraine is limited and the Kremlin is disarmed by an important weapon, such as «sphinx» the gas pipelines to Europe. Hence the intense, methodical and varied effort of the Russian agent to intervene in the political events of our country, with the main focus on the fall of Kyriakos Mitsotakis' government.
Berlin
But reactions appear on the Berlin side. And these are the most problematic. Germany loses the role of the main energy negotiator and ombudsman, with the centre of gravity shifting from Central to Southeast Europe. Berlin translates this new reality into a loss of power, influence and control, automatically triggering a negative attitude. After seeing that the energy policy pursued from 1970 to this day, it is being completely dismantled.
The Story
The root of German dependence on Russian gas is in so-called «Ostpolitik», i.e. «Eastern policy». Politics adopted by Social Democrat Chancellor Willy Brandt in the early 1970s. The central idea was deeply political. Based on the belief that close economic ties between West Germany and the Soviet Union would make a war conflict between the two countries inconceivable and at the same time lead to the political democratization of the Soviet Union. During the same period, the movement of Ecologists – Greens and the Left, succeeded in cancelling all plans for the transition to atomic energy, serving the interests of the USSR. At the same time neighboring France was unfolding its own energy plan based on nuclear reactors.
Germany's reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall 1989, further improved relations between the single Germany and the Soviet Union. Germany, the «industrial locomotive» Europe needed enormous quantities of energy for heavy industry, particularly in the field of chemicals, cars and steel. Russian gas was the ideal solution, since it was abundant, cheap and theoretically reliable.
In the early 2000s Chancellor Schroeder laid the foundations for «Nord Stream 1», a pipeline that would directly link Russia to Germany through the Baltic. After the end of his term, Gerhard Schroeder, took up key positions in under Russian equity control Gazprom Nord Stream AG and then in also Russian interests Rosneft.
But Chancellor Merkel, despite the constant warnings and objections of the US and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, continued the same design, making it «Nord Stream 2».
Berlin's perception that Russia was a necessary trading partner, brought Germany in 2021 to depend 55% on Russian gas, 35% on Russian oil and 50% on Russian coal.
The Russian invasion
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, led to «Zeitenwende». That is, at the historic turning point, as Chancellor Olaf Schultz had named it. Germany was faced with an existential risk to its industry. Thus he was forced to build LNG terminals (liquidated gas) in record time, re-activate coal plants and seek new suppliers, such as the US, Norway and Qatar.
Today
As regards the supply of LNG, via Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel terminals, etc., Germany imports 90% to 95% from the US. So we understand that Germany’s reactions do not concern the American LNG itself, since as we see the US is its almost exclusive supplier. But they concern the strength, control and profits of the Vertical Axis.
Germany has invested billions of euros to build LNG terminals in its own ports, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. But the Vertical Corridor makes Greece and in particular the port of Alexandroupolis, the new entrance gate to Central and Eastern Europe. If the American LNG starts flowing from the South to the North, German infrastructure will lose its role as Europe's main energy hub, reducing revenues from transit charges, but also Germany's geopolitical influence on its neighbours.
In addition to transit charges, Germany imposes a storage charge on gas exports from its territory to neighbouring countries. An end that causes constant conflicts with Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as this second end makes the gas coming through Germany very expensive. The Vertical Corridor offers these countries an alternative route through Greece, bypassing Germany. So Berlin is afraid that this will weaken its own network and make its own warehouses less competitive.
The emergence of Greece to a central energy player, or like the international term «Energy Hub», changes the balance of power in the EU, which Berlin reacts to in order to avoid creating competitive corridors that will challenge Germany's energy sovereignty in Europe.
