Can someone be found owing millions for a company that essentially never ran? The answer, in the act of tax administration, has been for years at least in some cases affirmative.
It is important that the European Parliament should be consulted on this matter. example of known businessman, who was faced with huge tax claims for a company to which he was formally associated, but without having effectively run it.
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The stake, then, was for years legal certainty and whether the Greek legislative framework could be attractive to investors and those who wanted to engage in the management of a company. Because the responsibility of the legal person and not of the natural person applies to public limited companies, so it is crucial that the responsibility attributed to individual natural persons is clear and, of course, is the exception. Otherwise, the phenomenon that is being observed will continue to increase, namely that companies cannot find persons willing to join their Board of Directors.
The key question, then, is whether the responsibility of the natural person is triggered on the basis of the title it holds or more substantive criteria should be sought. The PH, two station decisions clarify the matter definitively.
The legal framework: Personal responsibility to the CPU and its limits
The basic principle of the corporate law of capital companies is that the legal person is liable for his debts and that the natural persons who run it are not responsible for their personal property. However, there is an important exception to this general principle.
The Income Tax Code provides that specific persons, such as directors, administrators, managing directors and liquidators, are personally and jointly responsible for the company's tax debts, in particular when it comes to non-tax returns, such as VAT or withholding taxes.
The purpose of the law is for persons exercising real management not to be able to invoke the corporate form to avoid liability. The problem here, however, is whether the persons mentioned are counted on the basis of formal status or actual administration exercise.
In short, the dissension so far has been whether the title is sufficient or whether it should be considered whether the person actually exercised the management of the company on the basis of his title.
The Council of State, with the Decision 2482/2025 He made it clear that the second should apply.
The President of the Board shall not be liable for tax debts without actual administration.
The case concerned an anonymous company to which they had been significantly imposed VAT fines due to receipt of virtual invoices in the years 2005 to 2009. The State, seeking the collection of the relevant amounts, was not limited to the legal person of the company, but also turned against a natural person, who had served as Chairman of the Board of Directors. This person was jointly held liable on the grounds that, in addition to his position in the Board, he was entrusted powers to represent the company, including before tax authorities.
In other words, the State considered that if the person represented the company against the tax administration he was also responsible for the proper fulfilment of the relevant obligations, thus also a personal report in the event of an infringement.
The person concerned, however, ended up as far as the SSR arguing that he did not hold a position as CEO or exercise management of the company. His argument was based on the fact that the status of Chairman of the Board is not included in the limited circle of persons personally responsible for the company's tax debts under the law. He even pointed out that others had the actual management authority and responsibility for making decisions about the operation of the company.
The STC agreed with him, judging that Chairmanship of the Board is not enough on its own to establish solidarity responsibility for the natural person. He pointed out that the provisions providing for personal liability constitute an exception from the principle of self-sufficiency of the legal person and should therefore be interpreted closely, without the possibility of proportional extension to persons not expressly designated by law.
In this context, he also stressed that the delegation of powers of representation to the tax authorities is not sufficient to give the person the status to be responsible, since it is not accompanied by an actual exercise of management or management.
A determining factor for the outcome of the case was the fact that it did not prove that this person exercised substantial management, expressing the company's will primarily. On that basis, the Court ruled that the extension of responsibility to natural persons cannot be based on formal criteria, but requires a clear link to the actual exercise of power.
This is an extremely interesting decision, which illustrates that the Supreme Administrative Court is now extremely important sparing in allowing the State turn against natural persons for the purposes of seeking company tax debts. In fact, this decision was followed by another extremely important decision that further highlights this trend, and this time to a personal company, where the responsibility of natural persons is taken for granted.
Even in the personal company, property is not enough.
The direction set out in Decision 2482/2025 is not limited to public limited companies where the distinction between a legal person and a natural person is more pronounced. On the other hand, it becomes even more important when it applies to the field of personal companies, as is apparent from the Decision 825/2025 of the Council of State, which touches the core of the personal responsibility of the partners.
The case concerned a limited company, in which it was found to be serious VAT non-return tax για τα έτη 2007 και 2008, με τα σχετικά ποσά να υπερβαίνουν τις 400.000 ευρώ. Η φορολογική διοίκηση στράφηκε όχι μόνο κατά της εταιρείας, αλλά και κατά φυσικών προσώπων που συνδέονταν με αυτήν ως ομόρρυθμοι εταίροι και διαχειριστές, θεωρώντας ότι η ιδιότητά τους αρκεί για να θεμελιώσει ευθύνη σε βάρος τους.
Ας μην ξεχνάμε ότι στις προσωπικές εταιρείες, και ιδίως στις ομόρρυθμες, η ευθύνη των εταίρων αποτελεί τον κανόνα και όχι την εξαίρεση. Ο ομόρρυθμος εταίρος ευθύνεται κατ’ αρχήν προσωπικά και απεριόριστα για τα χρέη της εταιρείας, γεγονός που θα μπορούσε να οδηγήσει στο συμπέρασμα ότι η φορολογική διοίκηση δεν χρειάζεται να αποδείξει κάτι περισσότερο από την ιδιότητά του. Με βάση αυτή τη λογική κινήθηκε και η ΑΑΔΕ, υποστηρίζοντας ότι για την επιβολή των σχετικών συνεπειών αρκεί η τυπική σύνδεση με την εταιρεία.
Το Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας, ωστόσο, ακολούθησε διαφορετική προσέγγιση. Παρά το γεγονός ότι πρόκειται για προσωπική εταιρεία, όπου η ευθύνη των εταίρων είναι ο κανόνας, το Δικαστήριο δεν δέχτηκε ότι η ιδιότητα του εταίρου λειτουργεί αυτομάτως ως βάση για την επέκταση της ευθύνης σε φορολογικό επίπεδο. Αντιθέτως, επέμεινε ότι απαιτείται να αποδεικνύεται ότι το συγκεκριμένο πρόσωπο ήταν πράγματι εντεταλμένο στη διοίκηση ή ότι ασκούσε στην πράξη καθήκοντα διαχείρισης και εκπροσώπησης κατά τον κρίσιμο χρόνο.
Στην προκειμένη περίπτωση, το Δικαστήριο διαπίστωσε ότι τα επίμαχα πρόσωπα δεν είχαν διαχειριστική εξουσία κατά τις χρήσεις στις οποίες ανάγονταν οι παραβάσεις, ούτε προέκυπτε από τα στοιχεία του φακέλου ότι είχαν προβεί σε πράξεις διοίκησης ή διαχείρισης που να δεσμεύουν την εταιρεία. Ιδίως, υπογράμμισε ότι η φορολογική διοίκηση δεν είχε προβεί σε συγκεκριμένη διερεύνηση της πραγματικής τους εμπλοκής, αλλά περιορίστηκε στην επίκληση της ιδιότητάς τους.
Με βάση τα δεδομένα αυτά, το ΣτΕ έκρινε ότι η επέκταση της ευθύνης σε βάρος τους δεν ήταν νόμιμη. Και τούτο παρά το γεγονός ότι η υπόθεση αφορούσε προσωπική εταιρεία, όπου, θεωρητικά, η σύνδεση μεταξύ εταίρου και ευθύνης είναι πολύ στενότερη. Η κρίση αυτή αποκτά ιδιαίτερη σημασία, διότι δείχνει ότι ακόμη και σε ένα πεδίο όπου η προσωπική ευθύνη θεωρείται σχεδόν αυτονόητη, το Δικαστήριο απαιτεί ουσιαστικά κριτήρια και όχι τυπικές προϋποθέσεις.
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