I am afraid that in Greece, at the level of our society, there is a happy complacency. A false certainty that allows us to believe that because we have endured the pandemic, the energy crisis, the war in Ukraine, the rise of interest rates and a series of external shocks, we can think that we are invulnerable. And that the crisis will not touch us. Huge mistake, made before.

Greece does today have much stronger defences. It has primary surpluses, debt deescalation as a percentage of GDP, stronger banks, increased investment, better market image and an economy that is still developing. Even the strict International Monetary Fund recognises the improvement of fiscal reliability and financial stability.

However, Greek «success story»It is faced with a dangerous spiral, as are the other Eurozone economies. Inflation + high bond rates + exact energy + slowing growth + increased state spending. And all of this appears in an economy that still needs very high growth and productivity rates to absorb its old weaknesses, overcome the resilient pathogens of the past and approach the European averages of economic indicators and welfare indicators.

So this spiral needs attention. Very careful.

First of all, inflation is not over yet. Inflation in August reached 3.8%, from 2.9% a year earlier. And average 12-month inflation is according to ELSTAT at 3.4%. So this is neither a transient inflation nor a temporary statistical derogation that we can ignore.

To make it clear that inflation begins with the absence of supply in the fuel sector due to the Gulf war and not excessive demand due to global warming. The energy crisis caused by this event is not limited to the petrol pump or electricity bill. It is transferred to transport, industry, services, food, and ultimately wages and self-powered citizens' expectations for even higher prices.

The Bank of Greece itself predicts inflation of 3.7% in 2026, compared with 2.9% in 2025. And the European Commission also sees 3.7% for 2026, pointing out that energy shock is gradually passing on to energy prices.

In front of «hard» Inflation, the ECB has increased the three main interest rates by 25 basis points, with the deposit rate reaching 2.50%.

This is perhaps the most dangerous part of today's environment. Because the central bank is faced with the classic dilemma of «Supply shock», where energy increases inflation at the same time it reduces disposable income and consumption. So the economy needs support, but support can fuel demand and inflation.

The European Commission itself warns of this very dynamic. An expansionary fiscal policy can support production, but at the same time strengthen inflationary pressures and require stricter monetary policy.

At the same time markets full of fear and uncertainty launch interest rates on government bonds. Of course, the rise in the yields of Greek bonds does not mean that the cost of serving the entire Greek public debt is automatically increasing. Greece has a long average duration of debt, a significant part of which is fixed interest rate, and has a capable «pillow» liquidity. Therefore, an increase in return on the secondary market will be delayed to the actual cost of borrowing the State.

But there is another route of danger transmission, much faster. Which passes through the banks. When bond returns go up, the cost of money increases on the market. Banks may currently have a strong deposit base and a better capital position, but they are not funded solely by deposits. They issue bonds, appeal to markets and invoice new loans in relation to the wider cost of money and the corresponding credit risk.

And then transmission to the real economy is almost engineering. More expensive bank money means more expensive business loan. It means more expensive investment funding. It means a higher dose for the borrower. It means stricter credit criteria. And eventually it means lower credit expansion.

At the same time, due to the increase in interest rates, some old friends will likely make their appearance. The «Red loans». We do not argue that we are returning automatically to the NPLs era of the past decade. Not at all. The quality of the Greek banking system has improved dramatically. The unperforming loan ratio had declined to 3.3% at the end of 2025, the lowest level since Greece's entry into the euro.

However, the risk is not negligible. A prolonged period of high inflation, precise energy, high interest rates and lower growth can create a very different problem. To push for debt service for the most vulnerable businesses and households.

The economic spiral of the crisis unfolds as follows:

  • energy shock leads to higher inflation,
  • higher inflation is treated at higher interest rates,
  • higher interest rates are converted into more expensive bank financing;
  • the most expensive bank financing leads to a lower credit extension;
  • the lowest credit in lower investments and the lowest consumption;
  • lower investments and weaker consumption make growth weaker,
  • the weaker growth exerts greater pressure on businesses; and
  • greater pressure on businesses is an increased risk of new red loans.

Greece is not directly in danger of a new debt crisis. It is risked by underestimating how quickly an external shock can turn into more expensive money, lower growth and greater pressure on the balance sheets of businesses, bank debt portfolios and household portfolios.

That is why the rise in bond yields should not be treated as another of the many charts on Bloomberg's screens. It is the precursor to the highest cost of money coming. And this cost, unlike the cost of public debt, can pass into the real economy much faster.

Of course, all these risks are present in «normal conditions»And they multiply in budgetary turmoil.

Europe and Greece are facing a new reality. The biggest problem is not that bond yields are increasing. It is that they increase when governments need more than less money.

Defence, energy security, investment, social expenditure and the green transition create enormous financial needs. In fact, Oxford Economics estimates that a more ambitious scenario of European defence spending could increase long-term returns by 40-50 basis points in the most budget-intensive economies.

The European Fiscal Board in turn warned that frequent use «exceptional exemptions» the financial rules on defence and energy security threaten the credibility of the European financial framework. Which is directly challenged.

Therefore, the new environment is not just a return to the past. It's a «new more expensive money regularity». And in this new reality, Europe will be judged not by how easily it can increase its costs, but by whether it can convince markets that its debt remains sustainable.

Everything that happens in the bond markets in Germany, France, Italy and Belgium reminds us that debt markets do not vote for governments. However, they price their credibility. Their credibility in relation to the budgetary policies pursued.

And when credibility begins to cost more and this is reflected in bond interest rates, the bill eventually reaches the taxpayer. Because it is the taxpayer who will pay the budget in the end «deflections». Especially in front of the elections where opposition parties throughout Europe promise the magical recipes that will leave behind their old model «Conventional systemic parties» and open a different path leading to a frontal conflict with fiscal and economic reality. Throughout Europe and Greece, where the government is watching, the opposition promises walking with dogs tied with sausage straps in the meadows of benefits and amerimesis.



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