The intense discussions That we had this week in Strasbourg on the housing and energy crisis They have again highlighted the need for a combination of direct interventions and structural changes.
The energy crisis requires measures to reduce prices directly, such as reducing energy taxation; Including VAT – options that depend largely on the political will of each government.
The structural assistance, However, they require vision, long-term planning and a strong commitment to achieving political objectives. A typical example is energy storage: It is a key condition for increasing production from RES and accelerating the electricityification of the economy. It is therefore a crucial instrument for detoxification from expensive imported fossil fuels and ultimately a central tool for price reduction.
What has Mr. Mitsotakis' government done about energy storage?
Objectives and commitments: In the ESREC of December 2024, energy storage is referred to as a second priority, immediately after «rapid development of RES», with an installed power of 6,253 MW by 2030. At the same time, the Recovery Fund of July 2021 provided for financial measures to enable all energy storage projects up to 1,380 MW to be operational by 31 December 2025.
Minimum progress: The target of the Recovery Fund was ultimately limited to 700 MW by the end of June 2026, while today the power is approximately 600–630 MW. The iconic work of pumping Amphiloxia —that we joined EU priority projects in 2013 and with my personal contribution to national strategic investments in 2014— not yet completed. Since then, no new tendering project has been integrated into these priorities.
Lost opportunity for European funding: EU priority projects (PCI) have just joined a battery storage project, in the economic and socially plagued by the energy transition Ptolemaida. However, this year the government refused to endorse its application for funding from the EU Connecting Europe Facility, preventing possible EU funding of up to EUR 117 million, with zero public national participation.
Delays in implementation: Although storage competitions have created in Greece a portfolio of hundreds of MW projects, the actual operation of the batteries has been dramatically delayed. This already has significant consequences for consumers, but also for small RES producers (photovoltaic): Production cuts from renewable energy sources, the cheapest source of energy, increased from 3.5% in 2024 to about 7.5% in 2025 and may reach 12% in 2026 — More than tripled in three years. In fact, the increase in cuts in 2025 was almost equal to the increase in RES in power generation in the same year, while the total annual cuts were almost equal to the increase in electricity from Φ.a. between 2024-2025! Finally by rejecting RES, due to failure in storage, no «fly» only the cheapest energy source, but we replace it with the most expensive imported source, that of natural gas.
The other side – demand management: Failure to save is only one aspect of the problem. Even on the basis of the claim of members of the government that its introduction is supposedly delayed intentionally, because technology evolution reduces the cost of batteries (NB: so the Greek government is much smarter than dozens of other European governments that are rapidly promoting batteries. It is apparently indifferent to Bulgaria's 52% in the storage capacity of RES, 24% of the Czech Republic, 15% of Switzerland and 14% of Italy and is sufficient to 2% of Greece), at least progress should be made as compensation. «virtual storage»: the management of demand, i.e. the shift of domestic and business consumption to overproduction hours from RES when energy is cheaper.
But also in demand management the country failed: In households δεν έχουν ακόμη εγκατασταθεί έξυπνοι μετρητές σε επαρκή αριθμό καταναλωτών (παρότι ο πρώτος διαγωνισμός είχε προκηρυχθεί το 2014), ούτε υπάρχουν ώριμα ενεργειακά προϊόντα και τιμολόγια που να αξιοποιούν αυτή τη δυνατότητα. Ενώ στις επιχειρήσεις δεν υπάρχει μηχανισμός οικονομικής αξιοποίησης της ευελιξίας στη ζήτηση ενέργειας. Απουσιάζει, δηλαδή, ένα σαφές μήνυμα – πλαίσιο στον ενδοημερήσιο μηχανισμό τιμών, που θα καθιστούσε οικονομικά ορθολογική την αλλαγή του προφίλ ζήτησης των ενεργοβόρων επιχειρήσεων.
Για να μειώσουμε τις τιμές και να άρουμε την ενεργειακή μας εξάρτηση από τα εισαγόμενα ορυκτά καύσιμα, δεν αρκεί η ραγδαία ανάπτυξη των ΑΠΕ. Χρειαζόμαστε να μετασχηματίσουμε το ενεργειακό μας σύστημα με την αποθήκευση, την διαχείριση της ζήτησης και την αναβάθμιση των δικτύων.
* Ο Γιάννης Μανιάτης είναι καθηγητής, Ευρωβουλευτής, Αντιπρόεδρος Σοσιαλιστών Δημοκρατών (S&D), πρ. Υπουργός
